Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law
Volume 16 | Issue 4

Article 3

2008

The Spy Who Sued the King: Scaling the Fortress
of Executive Immunity for Constitutional Torts in
Wilson v. Libby
Scott R. Daniel
American University Washington College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Torts Commons
Recommended Citation
Daniel, Scott R. "The Spy Who Sued the King: Scaling the Fortress of Executive Immunity for Constitutional Torts in Wilson v.
Libby." American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law. 16, no. 4 (2008): 503-526.

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.

Daniel: The Spy Who Sued the King: Scaling the Fortress of Executive Immu

THE SPY WHO SUED THE KING:
SCALING THE FORTRESS OF
EXECUTIVE IMMUNITY FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS IN
WILSON V. LIBBY
SCOTT R. DANIEL*
I. Introduction ............................................................................................504
II. Background ...........................................................................................506
A. Ubi Jus, Ibi Remedium: The Remedial Right Maxim in
Anglo-American Tort Law ......................................................506
B. From Bell to Bivens: The Forging of a Judicial Remedy for
Constitutional Torts .................................................................507
C. Bivens’ Slippery Slope: “Special Factors” as a
Jurisprudential Bar to Recovery ..............................................509
D. Excusing the Executive: The Use of Statutory Preclusion,
Qualified Immunity, and the Totten Doctrine to Limit
Liability for Scooter Libby ......................................................510
III. Analysis ...............................................................................................511
A. From Damages to Nothing: Wilson Demonstrates that Bivens
Should Be Interpreted to Create the Presumption of a
Remedy....................................................................................512
B. Piercing Immunity: Constitutional Jurisprudence and the
IIPA Defeat Qualified Immunity under Harlow......................515
C. False Alternative: Misapplication of the Privacy Act in
Wilson Underscores the Need for a Clear Statement Rule ......519
D. Airing Dirty Secrets: The Court Should Narrow the Scope of
Totten and Explore Alternatives to Outright Dismissal...........523
*
J.D. Candidate, May 2009, American University, Washington College of Law;
B.A. 2005, University of Nevada. Thank you to Ari Stern, Pat Fitch, and the Journal
editors for their editorial guidance; to Professors Paul Figley and Stephen Vladeck for
their wisdom and insight; to Milton Hyams, who ignited in me a lifelong love for the
Constitution as a senior at Edward C. Reed High School; to countless colleagues,
friends, and family members, especially my parents, Michael and Eileen Daniel, who
have helped me find my voice; and to my Creator, who inspired me to believe that
rights are inalienable and that justice is immutable.

503

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2008

1

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 4 [2008], Art. 3

504

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 16:4

IV. Conclusion...........................................................................................525

I. INTRODUCTION
On July 19, 2007, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia dismissed a constitutional tort action brought by Joseph C. and
Valerie Plame Wilson against I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, Karl Rove,
Richard Armitage, and Vice President Richard Cheney individually as
members of the Office of the President.1 The suit arose from the 2003
publication of a Robert Novak column in the Washington Post that revealed
Ms. Wilson’s classified identity as a covert CIA operative specializing in
nuclear disarmament.2 The Wilsons alleged that the defendants supplied
Novak with Ms. Wilson’s identity in order to retaliate against Mr. Wilson
for his public opposition to the invasion of Iraq.3 Mr. Wilson claimed that
President Bush used falsified evidence that Saddam Hussein had been
pursuing weapons of mass destruction in West Africa as a pretext for war.4
As a consequence of her exposure, Ms. Wilson left her employment at the
CIA, fearing for the safety of herself and her family.5
The Wilsons sued the defendants pursuant to a constitutional tort action
under Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.6
The Wilsons argued that the defendants violated their First and Fifth
Amendment rights by disclosing Ms. Wilson’s identity.7 Nevertheless, the
1. See Wilson v. Libby, 498 F. Supp. 2d 74, 88-89 (D.D.C. 2007) (identifying
these and other individuals, and not the Office of the President itself, as defendants in a
constitutional tort action).
2. See Robert Novak, Mission to Niger, WASH. POST, July 14, 2003, at A21
(revealing, for the first time, Ms. Wilson’s CIA status).
3. See Amended Complaint at ¶ 2, Wilson v. Libby, 498 F. Supp. 2d 74 (D.D.C.
2007) (Civ. No. 06-1258) (claiming that the disclosure of Ms. Wilson’s identity was
the result of a conspiracy designed to punish Mr. Wilson for his expression of political
dissent).
4. See Joseph C. Wilson IV, Op-Ed., What I Didn’t Find in Africa, N.Y. TIMES,
July 6, 2003, § 4, at 9 (rebuking Bush’s citation of such evidence in his 2003 State of
the Union address by referencing his 2002 diplomatic visit to Niger in which he
encountered documentary evidence that Iraq had not been pursuing enriched
yellowcake uranium there).
5. See generally VALERIE PLAME WILSON, FAIR GAME: MY LIFE AS A SPY, MY
BETRAYAL BY THE WHITE HOUSE (2007) (describing the devastating personal and
professional impact of the disclosure of her covert status on the Wilsons’ lives, careers,
and marriage).
6. 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971) (allowing plaintiffs to recover monetary damages
directly from federal employees for the violation of their constitutional rights); see
Wilson, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 82 (citing Bivens as the legal basis for the Wilsons’ cause of
action against the defendants).
7. See Amended Complaint, supra note 3, at ¶¶ 46-64 (alleging that Ms. Wilson’s
outing was an unconstitutional retaliation against Mr. Wilson’s First Amendment right
to free speech and constituted a constructive deprivation of her privacy rights and
property interest in CIA employment under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
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district court dismissed the suit on the heels of President Bush’s
commutation of Libby’s criminal sentence for obstruction of justice and
perjury in the criminal investigation into Ms. Wilson’s disclosed identity.8
This led many to believe that political machinations had triumphed over the
fair administration of civil justice.9 The court dismissed the Wilsons’
claims outright, despite the significant body of case law supporting the
claims.10 The Wilsons subsequently filed a notice of appeal to the D.C.
Circuit, which heard oral arguments on May 9, 2008.11
This Comment contends that the Wilsons should not have been denied
proper relief by the district court on the grounds that the violation of a
constitutional right creates the presumption of a damages remedy that can
only be supplanted where Congress has provided a meaningful statutory
alternative or where the government presents a clear showing that the claim
should not be adjudicated. Part II provides the jurisprudential context for
Bivens that led to the dismissal of the Wilsons’ claims.12 Part III argues
Amendment); Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to
Defendants’ and the United States’ Motion to Dismiss at 15-28, Wilson v. Libby, 498
F. Supp. 2d 74 (D.D.C. 2007) (No. 06-1258) [hereinafter Plaintiff’s Memorandum]
(alleging that defendants improperly retaliated against Mr. Wilson’s free speech rights,
discriminated against Ms. Wilson as a so-called “class of one” under Equal Protection,
violated her expectation of privacy, and deprived her of her property interest in her
employment at the CIA).
8. See United States v. Libby, 495 F. Supp. 2d 49, 56 (D.D.C. 2007) (upholding
the constitutionality of the President’s grant of clemency to Libby).
9. See Amy Goldstein, Bush Commutes Libby’s Prison Sentence, WASH. POST,
July 3, 2007, at A1 (citing three polls indicating that roughly seventy percent of
Americans opposed any form of leniency for Libby).
10. See, e.g., Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000)
(recognizing “class of one” Equal Protection actions where a homeowner suffered
irrational and arbitrary discrimination when public officials forced her to accept a 33foot easement over her property); Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 73
(1990) (recognizing standing for public employees who were discriminated against on
the basis of their political affiliation); Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425,
465 (1977) (protecting the right of an individual to keep secret certain information for
which he or she has a reasonable expectation of privacy); Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (holding that the government may not retaliate against its
employees for their exercise of free speech); Toolasprashad v. Bureau of Prisons, 286
F.3d 576, 586 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (ruling that a prisoner who was transferred on the basis
of his exercise of free speech suffered an impermissible “adverse action”); Butera v.
District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (denying qualified immunity to
public employees who have reason to know that their actions are patently illegal and/or
unconstitutional); Ashton v. Civiletti, 613 F.2d 923, 930 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (recognizing
a property interest in federal employment at the FBI and requiring due process for the
termination thereof). But see Doe v. Gates, 981 F.2d 1316, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(holding that the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 403(c) (2000), which
allows for the at-will termination of CIA employees, denies a right to continued
expectation of employment).
11. Wilson v. Libby, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 29844 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 20, 2007). See
Plame Appeals Dismissal of Suit, CHI. TRIB., May 11, 2008, at C9 (reporting that the
Wilsons asked the D.C. Circuit to remand the case to the district court for a full
consideration of the merits of their claims).
12. See infra Part II (exploring the early development of Bivens in light of the right
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that Bivens created a presumptive default remedy in damages for the
violation of vested constitutional rights.13 Part IV calls for reversal of the
district court on appeal and suggests possible statutory alternatives.14
II. BACKGROUND
A. Ubi Jus, Ibi Remedium: The Remedial Right Maxim in Anglo-American
Tort Law
Bivens rests upon the common law tort principle that a violation of any
legal right entitles victims to a commensurate remedy.15 The concept of a
right to a remedy can be traced as far back as the Magna Carta of 1297,
establishing the basic right of Englishmen to vindicate injuries to their
rights.16 Common law jurists interpreted this “remedial right” as a
guarantee providing individuals with free and open access to the courts to
redress grievances.17 This is the principle of ubi jus, ibi remedium: where
there is a right, there must also be a remedy.18
The remedial right maxim is embedded in American constitutional
jurisprudence.19 Specifically, it provides American courts with the impetus
to establish independent causes of action where none exist by statute.20
to a remedy and the recent application of “special factors” to bar otherwise valid Bivens
claims).
13. See infra Part III (offering a “clear statement” rule presuming a Bivens remedy
and applying this rule to Wilson v. Libby).
14. See infra Part IV (observing the trajectory of Bivens away from the
presumption of a remedy and calling on Congress to either augment or replace Bivens
by statute).
15. Cf. Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S.
CAL. L. REV. 289, 293 (1995) (arguing that Bivens is a straightforward application of
the right to a remedy for constitutional violations and charging federal courts with the
responsibility of fashioning damages where none exist on remedial rights grounds).
16. See MAGNA CARTA 1297, cl. 29 (1297) (providing that no Englishman will be
denied “Justice or Right” before the courts).
17. See generally Ashby v. White, (1703) 92 Eng. Rep. 126 (K.B.) (cementing as
fundamental the right of aggrieved plaintiffs to access the courts to seek remedies for
wrongs they suffered); WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *23 (declaring that
the right to obtain a remedy where one has sustained a cognizable injury is a general
and indisputable rule).
18. See 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 104 (2007) (linking the remedial right
maxim to the vindication of constitutional rights).
19. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (echoing Blackstone’s
assessment of the necessity of a legal remedy to sustain the authenticity of individual
rights); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (grounding the historical role
of American courts to provide equitable relief on the right to a remedy); see also Tracy
A. Thomas, Ubi Jus, Ibi Remedium: The Fundamental Right to a Remedy Under Due
Process, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1633, 1636 (2004) [hereinafter Ubi Jus, Ibi Remedium]
(proposing that the right to a remedy has risen to the level of a fundamental right under
Due Process).
20. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) (affirming that courts may use any
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Accordingly, federal courts have historically provided a default remedy in
damages wherever injunctive relief is insufficient.21 A number of states
provide constitutional guarantees that plaintiffs enjoy open access to
judicial remedies.22
B. From Bell to Bivens: The Forging of a Judicial Remedy for
Constitutional Torts
Prior to Bivens, a number of commentators invoked the remedial rights
maxim to argue that Article III judges could fashion damages remedies for
violations of constitutional rights without specific statutory authorization.23
Though Congress afforded citizens the right to sue state governments for
constitutional torts, it did not waive the sovereign immunity of the federal
government for the same, creating a remedial gap between state and federal
liability for constitutional torts.24
In Bell v. Hood, Arthur Bell attempted to close this gap by seeking
monetary damages against individual FBI agents for infringing the Fourth
and Fifth Amendment rights of members of a California religious cult.25
Bell contended that constitutional tort claims could be inferred directly
from the Constitution, pursuant to federal statutory jurisdiction over all
claims arising under the Constitution or a federal statute.26 Though the
Supreme Court accepted Bell’s argument that it could hear this novel
constitutional claim under general jurisdiction, it avoided the substantive
available remedy to address an injury to a constitutional right even where the
legislature has provided no specific cause of action to enforce it).
21. See McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18,
43 (1990) (noting that injunctive relief is necessary to restore plaintiffs to a position
comparable to the position they occupied before the infliction of harm).
22. See Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 23 P.3d 333, 356 (Or. 2001)
(interpreting the Oregon Open Courts clause in light of ubi jus, ibi remedium to allow
access to judicial remedies even where a statutory alternative was already available).
23. See, e.g., Al Katz, The Jurisprudence of Remedies: Constitutional Legality and
the Law of Torts in Bell v. Hood, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 41 (1968) (arguing that the
Constitution itself is a source of substantive rights that imply judicially created causes
of action).
24. See Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1871) (providing statutory
authorization for tort suits against state governments for violations of constitutional
rights); Tracy A. Thomas, Congress’ Section 5 Power and Remedial Rights, 34 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 673, 697-98 (2001) (discussing Congress’s power to waive state, but not
federal, sovereign immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment); Michael B. Hedrick,
Note, New Life for a Good Idea: Revitalizing Efforts to Replace the Bivens Action with
a Statutory Waiver of the Sovereign Immunity of the United States for Constitutional
Tort Suits, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1055, 1056 (2003) (arguing that Congress should
waive its sovereign immunity and enter itself as a defendant in Bivens suits).
25. See Bell, 327 U.S. at 679-80 (describing the forceful arrest of Bell and his
followers as the alleged grounds for an Article III tort action).
26. See id. at 680-81 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 41(1) (2006) for the proposition that
general jurisdiction implies any necessary legal or equitable action to correct the
violation of a substantive right).
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question whether Bell had truly stated a claim and remanded review of the
merits of the decision to the district court.27 In so doing, the Court opened
the door for the possibility of individual liability for constitutional torts,
noting that it was the responsibility of courts to use any means available to
heal constitutional injuries.28
Twenty-five years elapsed before the Supreme Court reexamined this
question in Bivens.29 In 1965, Webster Bivens sued six federal narcotics
agents individually for damages arising out of a warrantless search of his
New York apartment in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.30 The
lower courts dismissed the case for failure to state a claim on which relief
can be granted.31 On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded,
holding that if Bivens could prove that the agents caused his alleged
injuries, then he could recover damages directly under the Fourth
Amendment.32 The Court’s analysis was a direct response to the questions
left unanswered in Bell.33 The Court quickly dispensed with the
respondents’ contention that Bivens could find relief in a state tort action,
noting that local trespass laws do not serve the same prophylactic purpose
of the Fourth Amendment and thus could not form the basis of relief for a
plaintiff in Bivens’ situation.34
While conceding that the Fourth
Amendment does not explicitly create such a cause of action, the Court
contended that the federal courts should still exercise their responsibility to
fashion appropriate remedies for rights violations.35 Because no injunctive
27. See id. at 684-85 (distinguishing between the question of subject matter
jurisdiction over alleged constitutional tort claims and the actual merits of Bell’s claim
for the purposes of surviving a motion to dismiss for failure to state a legitimate claim).
28. See id. at 683-84 (linking the legitimacy of a constitutional tort claim to general
jurisdiction and the historic role of the courts to apply remedies at law and equity).
29. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971) (establishing precedent for constitutional tort action against
individual government employees who violate the Constitution in their capacity as
government employees).
30. See id. (describing how the officers “manacled” Bivens in front of his family
and subjected him to a visual strip search).
31. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 276 F.
Supp. 12, 14-16 (E.D.N.Y. 1967), rev’d, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (asserting that state tort
law, and not the Constitution, provided the appropriate grounds for relief).
32. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397 (applying the remedial right maxim to justify the
creation of a cause of action for Bivens).
33. See id. at 389 (affirming that the Constitution implied a private cause of action
in tort).
34. See id. at 393-94 (explaining that government agents could lawfully enter areas
that private persons could not, rendering local trespass laws virtually inapplicable).
35. See id. at 392, 395-96 (citing the Bell rule that courts must provide relief where
no alternative remedy exists and that, historically, damages have been the common
remedy); see also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978) (viewing statutory
omission of a remedy as deference to the traditional responsibility of the courts to
fashion them).
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or declaratory relief would mend his injury, Bivens was entitled to
damages, irrespective of the absence of any specific statutory cause of
action.36
C. Bivens’ Slippery Slope: “Special Factors” as a Jurisprudential
Bar to Recovery
Bivens broke new ground in federal jurisprudence by constructing a
damages remedy for constitutional violations by federal employees where
none previously existed.37 However, Bivens proved to be fertile ground for
conflict among commentators over the next thirty-seven years.38 Much of
this conflict is rooted in Justice Brennan’s ambiguous dicta at the end of his
majority opinion in Bivens, which at once declared the necessity of
matching rights with remedies while conceding that there may be certain
“special factors” under which otherwise valid Bivens claims might not be
justiciable.39 If a claim could not be preempted by a special factor or
precluded by a statutory alternative, then the claim would be allowed to go
forward.40
The Court, however, failed to offer a clear standard for the purposes of
dismissing a Bivens claim under special factors.41 In the decade that
followed, the special factors analysis remained significantly
underdeveloped as the Court focused on extending the applicable scope of

36. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392, 395-96; cf. Katz, supra note 23, at 5 (arguing that
constitutional rights are self-executing when coupled with general jurisdiction).
37. See Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword,
85 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1532 (1972) (commenting on the rarity of constitutional rights
as affirmative causes of action and the possible implications of the creation of a selfexecuting remedy for constitutional torts in Bivens).
38. Compare Henry Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1, 23-24 (1975) (construing Bivens as a matter of constitutional common
law and thus subject to congressional amendment), with Joan Steinmann, Backing Off
Bivens and the Ramifications of this Retreat for the Vindication of First Amendment
Rights, 83 MICH. L. REV. 269, 279 (1985) (insisting that Bivens claims arise directly
from the Constitution itself and thus should not be preempted by statute). See
generally Lawrence Rosenthal, A Theory of Governmental Damages Liability: Torts,
Constitutional Torts, and Takings, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 797 (2007) (applying a costbenefit analysis to demonstrate the necessity of causes of action for any sort of
government invasion of right as a means of creating incentives for good political
behavior).
39. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396-97 (providing only anecdotal examples of instances
where special factors might mitigate against a Bivens claim, including the protection of
intelligence or military secrets).
40. See id. at 397 (requiring that any statutory alternative must provide a remedy
comparable to that supplied by Bivens).
41. See Note, Bivens Doctrine in Flux: Statutory Preclusion of a Constitutional
Cause of Action, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1251, 1254-55 (1988) [hereinafter Bivens in Flux]
(lamenting the absence of an unambiguous standard for “special factors” that would
forbid courts from dismissing Bivens actions on vague and ambiguous grounds).
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constitutional tort claims.42 Beginning in the 1980s, however, the Court
synthesized special factors and statutory preclusion to circumscribe and
dramatically narrow the applicability of Bivens, to the chagrin of a number
of scholars.43 The Court first applied statutory preclusion as a special
factor in Bush v. Lucas to dismiss a First Amendment retaliatory
termination claim brought by a NASA employee.44 The Court later
expanded this line of analysis in Schweiker v. Chilicky by invoking
statutory preclusion where minimal relief would be granted under an
alternative remedial scheme.45 Many commentators decried this narrowing
of Bivens, asserting that the Court abdicated its responsibility to provide
Bivens remedies by conflating statutory preclusion with other special
factors to deny otherwise valid Bivens claims.46 After the 1980s, plaintiffs
found it increasingly difficult to rely on Bivens to obtain judicial relief.47
D. Excusing the Executive: The Use of Statutory Preclusion, Qualified
Immunity, and the Totten Doctrine to Limit Liability for Scooter Libby
The Supreme Court strengthened the presumption against a Bivens
remedy just prior to Wilson in Wilkie v. Robbins, dismissing Wilkie’s
Bivens claim though no alternative remedy was available on policy grounds
and denying relief for a cumulative Fifth Amendment violation of a

42. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 23-24 (1980) (extending Bivens to
violations of the Eighth Amendment where an inmate was beaten to death by prison
guards under the watch of a negligent warden); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 24142 (1979) (providing a Bivens remedy for the wrongful termination of a congressional
employee in violation of her First Amendment rights).
43. See Gene R. Nichol, Bivens, Chilicky, and Constitutional Damages Claims, 75
VA. L. REV. 1117, 1126 (1989) (noting that in the 1980s, the Court used special factors
as an “escape hatch” to evade preserving liability for certain Bivens claims); Tamar
Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67 VA. L. REV. 553, 553-54 (1981) (arguing that
implied rights of action arise from all federal rights even absent congressional
authorization).
44. 462 U.S. 367, 388-89 (1983) (holding that Congress had implicitly preempted
Bivens claims for a plaintiff who had not exhausted remedies available through the
Civil Services Commission).
45. 487 U.S. 412, 420-21 (1988) (precluding a Bivens claim for Social Security
recipients on administrative exhaustion grounds).
46. See Betsy J. Grey, Preemption of Bivens Claims: How Clearly Must Congress
Speak?, 70 WASH. U. L. Q. 1087, 1088-89 (1992) (proposing the application of a brightline standard requiring Congress to express clear intent to preempt a claim); Perry M.
Rosen, The Bivens Constitutional Tort: An Unfulfilled Promise, 67 N.C. L. REV. 337,
357 (1989) (highlighting immunity defenses, statutory alternatives, and the burden
placed upon plaintiffs in pleading their claims against the government with specificity
as major obstacles to recovery under Bivens).
47. See George D. Brown, Letting Statutory Tails Wag Constitutional Dogs—Have
the Bivens Dissenters Prevailed?, 64 IND. L.J. 263, 265 (1989) (arguing that the Court
wrongly subverted the relationship between constitutional and statutory law by
allowing statutory obstacles to block otherwise valid constitutional causes of action).
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rancher’s right to his land.48 Following the reasoning used in Wilkie, the
district court denied the Wilsons’ claims applying a similar mix of statutory
preclusion and other factors.49 The court reasoned that the civil and
criminal remedies provided by the Privacy Act and the Intelligence
Identities Protection Act (IIPA), in concert with the special factors of
qualified immunity and the necessity of protecting covert espionage
activities from discovery in open court, warranted dismissal of the Wilsons’
claims.50
III. ANALYSIS
As a matter of stare decisis, the Wilson decision does not venture far
from the jurisprudential trail blazed by the application of special factors in
48. See Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2600 (2007) (preempting Bivens relief
for a series of incremental infringements of a rancher’s property rights by the Bureau of
Land Management, even where a piecemeal combination of federal and state remedies
was deemed insufficient for statutory preclusion, because the federal government may
induce a citizen into granting an easement through incremental activities); see also
Laurence H. Tribe, Death by a Thousand Cuts: Constitutional Wrongs without
Remedies after Wilkie v. Robbins, 2007 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 23, 24-25 (2007) (arguing
that many constitutional violations are cumulative and thus merit Bivens actions just as
if the violation were accomplished with only one act).
49. See Wilson v. Libby, 498 F. Supp. 2d 74, 85 (D.D.C. 2007) (noting that Wilkie
mirrors established law in the D.C. Circuit regarding general principles relating to
statutory remedial schemes and Bivens remedies); cf. Spagnolia v. Mathis, 859 F.2d
223, 227 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
50. See Wilson, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 88, 91-92 (holding that combined application of
statutory preclusion, qualified immunity, and other special factors are sufficient to
defeat a Bivens claim even if none of these applications would independently defeat a
claim, and acknowledging that the Privacy Act is a “highly technical statute” with
limited application, and that the IIPA is a criminal statute, which provides no civil
recourse); see also Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2000) (prohibiting federal agencies
from disclosing personal records on file without the consent of the person in question);
Intelligence Identities Protection Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 421-426 (2000) (criminalizing the
exposure of clandestine intelligence agents); Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 11 (2005)
(arguing that Totten v. United States applies to any case that would precipitate the
disclosure of espionage activity); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)
(providing qualified immunity for federal officials where a claim does not implicate
clearly established law applicable at the time of the offense); Totten v. United States,
92 U.S. 105, 107 (1876) (barring the adjudication of contractual claims pertaining to
secret espionage agreements); Daniel L. Pines, The Continuing Viability of the 1875
Supreme Court Case of Totten v. United States, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1273, 1299 (2001)
(insisting that Totten is necessary to prevent former CIA employees from “grey
mailing” the agency into settlement through the threat of litigation). But see Webster v.
Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603-04 (1988) (granting the power of judicial review for
constitutional claims against the CIA); Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36, 43 (2d
Cir. 1958) (allowing for in camera judicial review of sensitive military secrets in some
cases); Sean C. Flynn, The Totten Doctrine and its Poisoned Progeny, 25 VT. L. REV.
793, 801 (2001) (challenging the expansion of Totten to apply to cases other than those
involving espionage agreements); J. Steven Gardner, The State Secret Privilege
Invoked in Civil Litigation: A Proposal for Statutory Relief, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
567, 591-95 (1994) (proposing alternatives to outright dismissal of claims implicating
national security secrets, including the use of in camera review, magistrates, and
special juries).
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Bush, Chilicky, and Wilkie.51 It also demonstrates how far this trail travels
away from the original spirit of Bivens.52 Bivens stood for the proposition
that rights require meaningful remedies for their violation, and that if
constitutional rights are to be meaningful, then the federal judiciary must
fashion a remedy in the absence of a statutory cause of action.53 Today,
however, Bivens plaintiffs must shoulder an increasingly difficult burden to
prove to the courts that their rights were not only violated, but are also
meaningful enough to merit those remedies.54 Although the Wilsons
demonstrated a set of alleged facts that formed the basis of a legitimate
cause of action, the district court, under the guise of Wilkie, effectively
insulated key players within the Bush Administration from any form of
civil accountability.55

A. From Damages to Nothing: Wilson Demonstrates that Bivens Should Be
Interpreted to Create the Presumption of a Remedy
In denying the Wilsons the opportunity to recover damages from the
defendants, the district court suggested that Bivens actions are not
universally applicable to all violations of constitutional rights.56 This
construction is wholly inconsistent with the underlying principle of
constitutional torts.57 Bivens stands for the proposition that rights require
remedies and, where a plaintiff has stated a valid Bivens claim, said
plaintiff should be entitled to the presumption of a damages remedy.58
Therefore, courts should entertain Bivens suits with this presumption in
51. See Wilson, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 85 (holding that alternative schemes do not need
to provide an adequate remedy to counsel against the adjudication of a Bivens claim).
52. See Rosen, supra note 46, at 371 (arguing that 1980s Bivens jurisprudence
distorted the original premise of the cause of action).
53. See Steinmann, supra note 38, at 297-98 (interpreting the First Amendment as
automatically giving rise to Bivens liability absent a statutory alternative).
54. See Tribe, supra note 48, at 46 (arguing that the presumption against a remedy
biased the Supreme Court in Wilkie into “manipulating out of existence” the plaintiff’s
Fifth Amendment rights).
55. See generally Plaintiff’s Memorandum, supra note 7 (describing the
independent constitutional merits of the Wilsons’ claims and the necessity of recovery
for holding culpable members of the Bush Administration accountable for their
actions).
56. See Wilson, 498 F. Supp. 2d. at 86 (applying the theory that Bivens suits may
be appropriate in some contexts but not in others to dismiss a suit against an
administrative agency).
57. See Rosenthal, supra note 38, at 856 (arguing that, on the grounds of political
accountability, courts should not apply discretionary means of granting immunity to
government defendants in constitutional tort claims).
58. See Tribe, supra note 48, at 64 (offering that Bivens plaintiffs should be
afforded the presumptive right to seek a remedy for the violation of their constitutional
rights by federal officials).
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mind and place the burden on the defendant either to prove that a
meaningful statutory alternative is available or to demonstrate a heightened
government interest that the claim should be dismissed.59
The presumption of such a remedy would read Bivens in its proper
light—as a constitutional application of the remedial right maxim.60 The
Court explicitly invoked the principle of ubi jus, ibi remedium in asserting
that the remedial right is an essential corollary of a constitutional right.61
Contemporary commentators read Bivens to provide a damages remedy
presumptively available to all plaintiffs.62 Indeed, this interpretation of
Bivens governed the first generation of its progeny, in which the Court
afforded a plaintiff bringing a Bivens action the presumption of a remedy.63
Some critics have countered that Bivens did not create the presumption
of a damages remedy because such a cause of action is not implicit in the
Constitution.64 Instead, the argument goes, a federal damages remedy for
the violation of a constitutional right is a legal fiction derived from
constitutional common law, just as damages remedies for state tort
violations are judicial creations from state common law.65 Accordingly,
these critics contend that, although the Constitution provides the
substantive definition of a right, a Bivens remedy is simply one of many
optional remedies available to the court to alleviate a plaintiff’s
constitutional injury.66
59. See Grey, supra note 46, at 1127 (postulating that a “clear statement” rule
would simultaneously protect the rights of plaintiffs and prompt Congress to consider
Bivens closely in drafting legislative remedial systems); cf. Ubi Jus, Ibi Remedium,
supra note 19, at 1634 (suggesting that remedial rights are fundamental rights of due
process, the derogation of which should be subject to strict scrutiny).
60. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 401 n.3 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (justifying the creation of judicial
remedies for rights violations as consistent with the common law doctrines of the
Founding Era).
61. See id. at 397 (majority opinion) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163
(1803)) (stating that the right to a remedy is central to the maintenance of ordered
liberty).
62. See Dellinger, supra note 37, at 1534 (interpreting Bivens to mean that damages
remedies are presumptively available to any plaintiff who suffers a compensable injury
to his or her constitutional rights).
63. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980) (affirming that Bivens
created the presumption of a remedy even absent a statutory cause of action); Davis v.
Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 242 (1979) (holding that absent the presence of a political
question, courts must adjudicate the violations of individual rights).
64. See Monaghan, supra note 38, at 23-24 (implying that unless a particular
remedy is codified or determined to be a necessary concomitant of a right, then the
remedy is malleable and subject to subsequent revision or revocation by Congress or
the courts).
65. See id. (declaring that Bivens reflected judicial policymaking for the purposes
of fulfilling the right to a remedy and that such a remedy should not be considered a
canon of constitutional law).
66. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 415 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (reasoning that all
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The fundamental problem with this approach is that it misunderstands
the nature of the Bivens remedy, which is not simply an optional political
nicety available only when courts choose to provide it.67 Even if a damages
remedy under Bivens is merely one enforcement mechanism as a matter of
constitutional common law, such mechanisms are necessary auxiliaries to
the enforcement of constitutional rights.68 While the Constitution does not
explicitly require a damages remedy for a constitutional violation, a
damages remedy is necessary where no other available remedy would
provide the appropriate relief.69 Bivens stands for the proposition that
constitutional rights necessitate judicial mechanisms that provide practical
weight and substance to the enforcement of those rights.70
The long-standing practice of federal courts granting injunctive relief for
constitutional torts, even absent statutory authorization, is instructive on
this point.71 Courts have historically granted injunctions to any plaintiff
seeking relief from federal violations of their constitutional rights.72
However, injunctive relief is only an effective cure to correct the violation
before it is completed; an injunction is per se inadequate where the
violation is fait accompli.73 Thus, to restrict the guarantee of a remedy to
judicially created remedial measures are created for the purposes of protecting or
enforcing an underlying right and are not indispensable requirements of the
Constitution itself).
67. See Frankel, supra note 43, at 563 (arguing that implied rights of action arise
from all federal rights even absent congressional authorization); cf. Rosenthal, supra
note 38, at 798 (contending that the vindication of constitutional torts should never be
left to the whims of discretionary political processes).
68. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395-96 (majority opinion) (justifying awarding Bivens
a damages remedy on the grounds that a remedy must be provided to a deserving
plaintiff); see also Steinmann, supra note 38, at 281-82 (arguing that Bivens remedies
may, of necessity, arise directly from the Constitution and are not subject to judicial
diminution).
69. See Bivens in Flux, supra note 41, at 1259 (arguing that even if Bivens
functions as a matter of constitutional common law and therefore does not self-execute,
a long line of lower court cases establish a precedent in favor of providing judicial
remedies where none currently exist).
70. See Dellinger, supra note 37, at 1534 (suggesting that “judicial prerogative”
necessarily created the Bivens remedy as a means of checking constitutional rights
violations).
71. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299, 301 (1955) (requiring
injunctive relief to expedite the integration of public schools); Spagnolia v. Mathis, 859
F.2d 223, 229-30 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that where a Bivens remedy would not be
applicable, a plaintiff still retained the right to an injunctive remedy).
72. Cf. McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18,
31 (1990) (interpreting the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as
placing an obligation on states to provide injunctive relief for constitutional rights
violations where appropriate).
73. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504-05 (1978) (noting that an irreparably
injured plaintiff definitively receives no remedial satisfaction from an injunction where
the harm suffered is permanent and the plaintiff cannot actually be restored to his or her
position prior to the commission of the tort).
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those situations in which the harm is still in progress is to immunize those
government actors whose constitutional torts have been successfully
completed.74
Injunctive relief is as ineffective for the Wilsons75 as the exclusionary
rule would have been to Bivens.76 Ms. Wilson’s CIA cover was blown and
she and her husband suffered the various harms alleged in the complaint.77
The Wilsons, like Webster Bivens, sustained an injury for which they are
faced with the prospect of “damages or nothing.”78
Consequently, while constitutional rights may not require damages
remedies for their violation per se, they do require some form of
vindication to be effective.79 A right without a remedy is a hollow,
normative declaration or idealistic sentiment, a toothless parchment barrier
with no real meaning.80 If a damages remedy is the ordinary method of
relief for the vindication of vested rights and no alternative exists, then a
Bivens remedy may approach the level of “hard” constitutional law as a
default remedy for aggrieved plaintiffs.81
B. Piercing Immunity: Constitutional Jurisprudence and the IIPA Defeat
Qualified Immunity under Harlow
If Bivens creates a presumptive right to a damages remedy, then it stands
to reason that the Wilsons needed only to state a clear cause of action
74. Id. (noting also that, because sovereign immunity is virtually impenetrable,
recouping monetary damages from individual defendants is the only real way for a
plaintiff in Bivens’ shoes to obtain relief).
75. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980) (justifying a damages remedy on
the grounds that the victim’s relatives satisfied the survivorship requirements of the
“federal common law” and could find vindication in no other means); cf. Amended
Complaint, supra note 3, at ¶ 42 (highlighting the totality of the Wilsons’ injury which
threatens their right to safety and security).
76. See Bandes, supra note 15, at 295, 305 (explaining that, because all actual
criminal charges against Bivens were dropped, the actual harm he suffered was not
wrongful prosecution, but the humiliation, degradation, and invasion of privacy
wrought by the malfeasant agents).
77. See PLAME WILSON, supra note 5, at 181-83 (describing the CIA’s efforts to
ramp up surveillance around the Wilsons’ D.C. home in order to protect them from
security threats created by Ms. Wilson’s exposure).
78. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971) (implying that the purpose of the Bivens remedy is to serve as
a default for those who have no other recourse available).
79. See Dellinger, supra note 37, at 1542-43 (arguing that in order to properly give
weight to the rights implicated in Bivens, the Court properly chose to create a remedy
for an aggrieved plaintiff rather than wait for Congress to do so).
80. See Ubi Jus, Ibi Remedium, supra note 19, at 1638 (asserting that rights without
accompanying remedies are merely normative societal abstracts without any real force
at law).
81. Cf. Steinmann, supra note 38, at 280 (refuting the notion that a damages
remedy derived directly from the Constitution is anything but a matter of constitutional
law, and that such remedies are not mere prophylactic devices).
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rooted in existing law to survive the defendants’ motions to dismiss.82
When constitutional rights are implicated under claims pursuant to either
Section 1983 or Bivens, plaintiffs must claim a cognizable injury
proximately caused by a government official’s violation of said rights in
order to defeat any invocation of qualified immunity.83 Though the
Wilsons articulated clear causes of action with regard to their First
Amendment free speech and Fifth Amendment privacy claims resulting
from actions that were clearly illegal at the time Ms. Wilson’s identity was
exposed, the district court grossly misapplied the Harlow standard in
considering defendants’ invocation of qualified immunity.84
The policy purpose for applying qualified or “good faith” immunity to
public officials is to balance the interest of government and its employees
with the rights of individual plaintiffs to recover damages for constitutional
torts. It is not designed to create an impenetrable procedural barrier to
liability operationally equivalent to absolute immunity.85 If the facts
alleged in the Wilsons’ complaint are presumed to be true for the purposes
of a motion to dismiss, then defendants’ actions were violations of the
Wilsons’ rights.86 Ironically, the defendants alluded to the wrongful nature
of their own actions in an attempt to invoke statutory preclusion under the
IIPA, which criminalizes the public release of the identity of any classified
intelligence agent.87
The Wilsons’ First Amendment claim rests upon the rule prohibiting
government retaliation against the legitimate exercise of free speech
established in Perry v. Sindermann.88 To support a Perry claim, the
82. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (explaining that justice
demands that a federal official must be put on notice that actions in violation of
existing rights could potentially be grounds for litigation).
83. See id. at 819 (explaining that qualified immunity serves the purpose of
deterring federal officials from lawless, not merely offensive or inappropriate, conduct,
and requires a clear statement of the legal basis for the removal of immunity); see also
Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1871).
84. Compare Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (requiring only an invocation of clearly
established rights), with Wilson v. Libby, 498 F. Supp. 2d 74, 86 (D.D.C. 2007)
(refusing to explore the merits of the Wilsons’ claims on the grounds that not all
constitutional rights give rise to liability sufficient to defeat qualified immunity).
85. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819 (reasoning that an objective standard would
simultaneously deter bad conduct and allow compensation of deserving victims).
86. See Amended Complaint, supra note 3, at ¶¶ 46-64 (demonstrating how the
defendants’ actions, in violation of the First and Fifth Amendments, were the
proximate cause of the Wilsons’ injuries by establishing a causal link between the
defendants’ intentional and unlawful disclosure of Ms. Wilson’s identity and the loss of
her employment, privacy, and security).
87. See Wilson, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 92 (citing the IIPA, which Congress enacted in
order to deter the very harm implicated by the Wilsons’ claim, as a special factor
precluding that claim).
88. See 408 U.S. 593, 596-98 (1972) (holding that a public college violated the
First Amendment by effectively terminating the employment of a professor who
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Wilsons must establish both that the speech Mr. Wilson was engaged in
was constitutionally protected and that the defendants’ response was in
direct retaliation against an individual substantial enough to deter a person
of “ordinary firmness” from so speaking again.89 The record demonstrates
a clear causal and temporal link between the publication of Mr. Wilson’s
op-ed in The New York Times and the disclosure of Ms. Wilson’s identity
as a CIA agent, and that the disclosure was a direct retaliatory response to
the op-ed.90 The threat that high-level executive officials might jeopardize
one’s safety, privacy, and career by disclosing a spouse’s covert status
would almost certainly chill the ordinary American from exercising his or
her right to speech.91
The Wilsons also set forth valid Fifth Amendment claims for the
invasion of their privacy and property interests under the Due Process
Clause.92 Individuals possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in
personal information that they objectively choose to keep private.93 This
undoubtedly includes personal information that the government itself
requires to be kept private under both the Privacy Act and the IIPA.94
Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit has explicitly held that undercover
government agents involved in treacherous operations possess a privacy
right against exposure to unnecessary danger under the state endangerment
doctrine.95 A blown CIA cover places the exposed agent in a significant
degree of peril if foreign agents use the information to target her for hostile
criticized the policies of the school administration).
89. See Toolasprashad v. Bureau of Prisons, 286 F.3d 576, 585 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(joining the majority of circuits in establishing an objective standard for applying the
chilling effect to First Amendment retaliation cases).
90. See Amended Complaint, supra note 3, at ¶ 19 (chronicling documented
evidence that Libby, Cheney, Rove, and Armitage actively supplied the information
pertaining to Ms. Wilson’s identity used by Robert Novak in his column outing her as a
CIA operative); see also Novak, supra note 2 (identifying Ms. Wilson to the public
shortly after he allegedly received information pertaining to her classified status from
the defendants).
91. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum, supra note 7, at 17 (noting that plaintiffs may
sustain First Amendment “chilling effect” claims for even de minimus retaliation and
the resulting effect on the free exercise of speech).
92. See id. at 17-25 (describing how the defendants’ actions resulted in a
constructive termination of Ms. Wilson’s employment and a gross invasion of her
privacy, two interests protected by the Fifth Amendment).
93. Cf. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977) (holding that the
President of the United States has a reasonable expectation of privacy in
communications that are not subject to statutory disclosure requirements or otherwise
do not involve important matters of general public interest).
94. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum, supra note 7, at 21-22 (explaining how the
legislative purpose behind the Privacy Act and the IIPA implicates a right to privacy
under the Fifth Amendment).
95. See Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 649 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(recognizing a right to informational privacy in one’s covert status if unveiling such
status endangers the covert operative).
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action, clearly implicating the prospect of physical injury as a proximate
result of the disclosure.96
The D.C. Circuit has also consistently held that government employees
possess a property interest in their employment if they have a reasonable
expectation that such employment will continue uninterrupted.97 Though
Ms. Wilson continued in her capacity as an employee of the CIA for a short
time after the disclosure of her identity, her exposure effectively prevented
her from continuing her ordinary operations undercover.98 Further, the
suggestion that Ms. Wilson did not have a sufficient property interest to
implicate Due Process simply because her employment could have been
lawfully terminated by the CIA director at will is erroneous. In fact, ample
precedent exists for the adjudication of CIA employment termination
claims arising out of direct agency action, let alone instances concerning
constructive termination by the political malfeasance of other Executive
officials that are not in the interests of national security.99
Each of the Wilsons’ allegations is thus rooted in clearly established
jurisprudence and the commission of activities that are criminalized by
federal statute.100 In spite of this legal clarity, the district court weakly
alluded to a bizarre amalgamation of policy rationales for denying the
substantive merits of the Wilsons’ claims.101 Interestingly, the court does
not speak to these rationales with specificity, nor do they offer any
substantive rebuttal to the Wilsons’ claims.102 Instead, the court punted on
96. See PLAME WILSON, supra note 5, at 179 (explaining that the Wilsons received
numerous threats to their persons and property in the immediate aftermath of her public
exposure).
97. See, e.g., Ashton v. Civiletti, 613 F.2d 923, 928 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (holding that
an FBI agent terminated solely on the grounds that he publicly admitted his
homosexuality had been deprived of his property interest in FBI employment without
Due Process under the Fifth Amendment).
98. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum, supra note 7, at 25 (advancing the argument that
disclosure of Ms. Wilson’s identity resulted in constructive termination as a CIA agent,
and ruined all prospects for promotion); see also PLAME WILSON, supra note 5, at 20203 (noting specifically that Ms. Wilson could no longer effectively function as a Covert
Operations Officer without putting her family at risk of significant harm).
99. Compare Doe v. Gates, 981 F.2d 1316, 1320-21 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that
a CIA employee did not have a property interest in his employment because the
director of the CIA could lawfully terminate him at will), with Webster v. Doe, 486
U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (upholding the jurisdiction of federal courts to hear a
constitutional claim pursuant to termination of CIA employment under the same
statute).
100. See Intelligence Identities Protection Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 421-426 (2000)
(criminalizing the same actions the defendants allegedly engaged in).
101. See Wilson v. Libby, 498 F. Supp. 2d 74, 83 (D.D.C. 2007) (failing to establish
any one independent special factor as sufficient grounds for dismissal of the Wilsons’
claims while combining many insufficient factors to justify dismissal).
102. Compare id. at 86 (avoiding any exploration of the substantive merits of the
Wilsons’ Bivens claim), with Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982) (asserting
that qualified immunity is an affirmative defense predicated in part on the objective

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol16/iss4/3

16

Daniel: The Spy Who Sued the King: Scaling the Fortress of Executive Immu

2008]

THE SPY WHO SUED THE KING

519

the qualified immunity question by melding it with statutory preclusion and
other special factors.103 If the Wilsons’ claims were dubious in the least,
the court should have simply recognized the defendants’ invocation of
qualified immunity and dismissed the case without further discussion.104 If
a claim is invalid to begin with, then there is no need to invoke special
The district court’s decision to avoid answering the
factors.105
straightforward qualified immunity question directly suggests that the court
was searching for a way to dismiss the claim and found an escape hatch in
the ambiguous special factors standard provided by Wilkie.106
C. False Alternative: Misapplication of the Privacy Act in Wilson
Underscores the Need for a Clear Statement Rule
If Bivens supports the normative presumption of a remedy and a plaintiff
sets forth a constitutional claim sufficient to survive a qualified immunity
defense, then statutory preclusion under special factors should only be
allowed where an alternative statutory or administrative remedial scheme
provides sufficient relief.107 Though the Bivens Court advanced a strong
case for the presumption of a remedy, later decisions have contradicted that
by allowing Congressional omission or inferences from vague legislative
history to undermine that presumption.108 Indeed, immediate post-Bivens
case law articulates that alternative remedial schemes should only displace
Bivens claims where Congress clearly states that the alternative remedy
was intended to be the exclusive remedy for a specific cause of action by a
specific class of plaintiffs against a specific class of defendants.109
merits of the plaintiff’s legal claims).
103. See Wilson, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 83 (passing on an independent analysis of
qualified immunity on the grounds that other special factors were sufficient grounds to
dismiss the Wilsons’ claims).
104. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (explaining that a finding of qualified immunity
should result in the quick dispensation of frivolous claims with no legal merit).
105. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971) (highlighting possible special factors as defenses
only after a lengthy discussion of the merits of the plaintiff’s claim).
106. See Wilson, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 85-86 (applying the Wilkie framework to
obfuscate the qualified immunity question). See generally Nichol, supra note 43, at
1150 (asserting that the Court’s use of the special factors analysis is generally an
indefensible means of avoiding Bivens questions entirely).
107. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397 (suggesting that Congress must intend to displace
Bivens through the creation of a statutory alternative remedy of subjectively equal
effect as a Bivens claim); see also Grey, supra note 46, at 1127 (explaining that
Congress must clearly express its intent to preempt a Bivens claim in light of a careful
consideration of the presumption of the right to a remedy).
108. See Spagnolia v. Mathis, 859 F.2d 223, 227 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (setting a
relatively low legislative inadvertence standard that views a legislative omission to
cover a specific tort in a particular remedial scheme as grounds for statutory
preclusion).
109. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1980) (ruling that the mother of a
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The standard the district court used to support statutory preclusion
fundamentally misconstrues the relationship between congressional
remedial power and constitutional rights.110 As a general principle,
Congress may not amend or otherwise denigrate a constitutional right by
statute.111 Congress may, however, determine the proper venue for the
adjudication of constitutional claims through statutory grants of
jurisdiction.112 As Bivens made clear, Congress has already provided
jurisdiction for the adjudication of a Bivens claim through its grant of
general jurisdiction over constitutional and statutory claims to federal
courts.113 Thus, the “equally effective alternative” to which the Bivens
Court referred was the purposeful removal of constitutional tort jurisdiction
from Article III courts to another venue of adjudication, not the diminution
of available remedies by yielding to statutory alternatives that may provide
a less effective remedy or none whatsoever.114
The district court nonetheless invoked statutory preclusion under the
inapplicable Privacy Act on the grounds that preclusion is legitimate both
where Congress provides a remedy for a specific injury and where it fails
to do so.115 In this case, the district court followed the D.C. Circuit
reasoning in Spagnolia: sifting through indistinct legislative history to find
evidence that it was not “inadvertent” that Congress failed to provide a
meaningful remedy to a class of plaintiffs.116 The problem with the
Spagnolia “inadvertence” standard is that it allows courts to make
inferences from Congressional silence in a statute that may or may not be

prisoner killed as a result of warden’s negligence, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, was entitled to relief on the grounds that the Constitution itself gives rise
to the Bivens cause of action despite the lack of any specific statutory authorization).
110. See Thomas, supra note 24, at 706 (contending that Congress’s role with regard
to remedial rights is generally limited to providing a venue for their enforcement).
111. See Steinmann, supra note 38, at 281 (insisting that Congress may not revise or
amend the substance of any provision of the Constitution).
112. Cf. Thomas, supra note 24, at 678 (asserting that Congress’s limited role over
the judicial enforcement of constitutional rights under Article I and Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment is in carrying out the underlying interest of seeing that the
rights are enforced, not to redefine their substance).
113. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681-82 (1946) (interpreting the federal general
jurisdictional statute to allow the adjudication of all constitutional claims, even those
rooted in novel theories).
114. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 399 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting that the abdication of the
Court’s jurisdiction would render the Constitution virtually meaningless).
115. See Wilson v. Libby, 498 F. Supp. 2d 74, 90 (D.D.C. 2007) (elevating the
omission of an equivalent remedy to the same status as the enactment of an equivalent
remedy for the purposes of statutory preclusion).
116. See Spagnolia v. Mathis, 859 F.2d 223, 228 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (arguing that
courts should defer to Congress where it has purposefully considered yet withheld
liability for a specific class of defendants through a comprehensive remedial scheme).
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supported by the legislative history.117 Congressional inaction thus does
not have to clear a very high threshold to be interpreted to preclude a
Bivens remedy.118 This posture effectively turns Bivens on its head by
elevating the policy decisions—and indecisions—of Congress over the
constitutional responsibilities of the federal courts to provide relief to
aggrieved plaintiffs.119
The conflation of statutory preclusion with other special factors in Wilkie
is rooted in the Court’s inability to articulate a clear standard for statutory
preclusion in Bush and Chilicky.120 By using inadequate alternatives as
mere special factors, the Court left the door wide open for the dismissal of
Bivens claims on vague grounds of policy discretion.121 Rather than
looking to whether the administrative alternative effectively vindicates the
rights of constitutional tort victims, courts now look to the
“comprehensiveness”
of
the
alternative.122
Evidently,
“comprehensiveness” applies to statutes with remote purposes that provide
a plaintiff with absolutely no civil relief whatsoever.123
Thus, although the district court conceded that the Privacy Act is a
highly technical statute that definitively excludes defendants as members of
the Office of the President, omissions inferred from tenuous legislative
history somehow demonstrated that Congress had intentionally omitted
such relief, justifying denial of a Bivens remedy.124 Ironically, the district
117. See Bivens in Flux, supra note 41, at 1267 (noting inconsistency in decisions of
the Court in determining how much latitude courts should be afforded in interpreting
Congressional silence in Bivens claims, particularly with regard to administrative
employment claims).
118. See Nichol, supra note 43, at 1148 (highlighting Chilicky as an example of how
the Court’s new reading of special factors and statutory preclusion could effectively
deprive a plaintiff of any remedy).
119. See Brown, supra note 47, at 272 (pointing out that Bivens treated the absence
of Congressional action as deference to the judiciary and that modern “special factors”
analysis had effectively nullified that rule by requiring Article III courts to defer to
Congressional silence before performing their adjudicative function).
120. See Nichol, supra note 43, at 1121-22 (predicting that the Chilicky standard
would effectively expand the use of ambiguous special factors to preempt otherwise
valid Bivens claims).
121. See id. (distinguishing the court’s legitimate interest in avoiding political
questions from mere deference to any and all congressional decisions with regards to
the remedies available to constitutional tort victims).
122. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 385 (1983) (expanding the scope of statutory
displacement beyond schemes that are truly effective to encompass those that are
comprehensive in nature, regardless of whether or not they provide the necessary relief
for the aggrieved plaintiff).
123. See Spagnolia v. Mathis, 859 F.2d 223, 228 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (allowing courts
to infer from silence that Congress did not unintentionally withhold a meaningful
remedy from a Bivens claimant).
124. See Wilson v. Libby, 498 F. Supp. 2d 74, 88-89 (D.D.C. 2007) (conceding that
the Privacy Act provides no relief to plaintiffs while simultaneously using the Act as a
special factor shielding the defendants from liability).
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court failed to note the parallels between the invocations of the Privacy Act
and IIPA provisions in Wilson from the hodgepodge of state and federal
remedies of Wilkie.125 Yet in Wilkie, the existence of an incomplete
remedial alternative alone did not constitute sufficient evidence that
Congress sought to prevent the open adjudication of Bivens actions.126
In hindsight, the quicksand at the end of the Court’s slippery slope was
entirely foreseeable.127 Many commentators have taken a hard line with the
Bush progeny for failing to provide any standards or guidance for invoking
statutory preclusion.128 On appeal, the Wilson case would present the
Supreme Court with an opportunity to correct this problem by replacing the
confusing Wilkie framework with a clear statement rule.129 For a court to
preclude a Bivens claim on statutory grounds, Congress must have
elucidated a clear intent either to displace Bivens expressly or to provide
the exclusive means for the government to supply a remedy through an
administrative alternative.130
Such a rule would eliminate or at least significantly reduce the
speculative uncertainty of the propriety of a Bivens claim, allowing
plaintiffs to bypass the expense of filing frivolous Bivens claims where an
alternative scheme is clearly provided.131 It would also put defendants on
notice, analogous to that provided by qualified immunity, as to when they
might be subjected to Bivens liability where no administrative alternative is
available to plaintiffs.132 A clear statement rule would assist courts in
125. Compare id. at 93 (considering both the Privacy Act and the IIPA special
factors absent any provision of relief for the Wilsons), with Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S.
Ct. 2588, 2600 (2007) (holding that the sum total of available state and federal
administrative remedies were alone insufficient to defeat the plaintiff’s Bivens claim).
126. See Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2600 (citing Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388 (1983))
(expanding on the jurisprudence on legislative silence that allows the courts to abdicate
their duty to provide relief to aggrieved plaintiffs whose claims fall in the gaps left
open by administrative alternatives).
127. See Steinmann, supra note 38, at 269 (predicting that the new special factors
jurisprudence would make it easier for defendants to invoke insufficient special factors
to evade liability for constitutional torts).
128. See Bivens in Flux, supra note 41, at 1254-55 (questioning the logic of the
Bush Court in utilizing a statute as a special factor justifying preclusion of a Bivens
claim even when it did not qualify as an equivalent alternative remedy).
129. Cf. Bandes, supra note 15, at 338 (encouraging the Court to abandon the two
prong test of statutory preclusion and special factors, and instead allow Congress either
to defer to judicial review or explicitly replace Bivens with other options).
130. See Brown, supra note 47, at 298 (suggesting that there are other ways to
resolve the difficulties inherent in adjudicating Bivens short of abandoning the
responsibility to provide a remedy).
131. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (providing that the
objective standard for qualified immunity would conserve judicial resources by
preempting unnecessary factual inquiries necessitated by a subjective test).
132. See. id. (providing that the objective standard for qualified immunity would
properly put defendants on notice of their own tort liability).
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appraising the worthiness of Bivens claims by sharpening the boundaries
between Bivens and other schemes.133 This rule would also allow courts to
avoid wholly unsustainable conclusions that a statute which provides no
relief to the plaintiff in question could possibly be grounds for
preclusion.134
D. Airing Dirty Secrets: The Court Should Narrow the Scope of Totten and
Explore Alternatives to Outright Dismissal
The final hurdle in the Wilsons’ path, the Totten doctrine, presents the
most enigmatic “special factor” utilized by the district court to dismiss the
claim.135 It also underscores the unique nature of the Wilsons’ Bivens
claim, involving high-level Executive officers waging political warfare
against a high-ranking member of the intelligence community.136 Under
Totten, federal courts will not adjudicate civil claims specifically arising
out of covert espionage contracts in order to protect state intelligence.137
The Totten doctrine is rooted in sound jurisprudential and policy
considerations.138 As a general matter, it is neither in the interests of the
plaintiff nor national security to subjugate the well-being of the nation as a
whole to the interests of one individual plaintiff seeking relief.139 As a
procedural matter, however, individual defendants are not entitled to
invoke Totten as a defense; it has long been established that only the United
States government can invoke Totten to prevent litigation.140 Yet the U.S.
government filed a brief in support of the defendants’ motions to dismiss

133. See Grey, supra note 46, at 1128 (suggesting that similar clear statement tests
in other contexts are judicially manageable and place no undue burden on the
legislature).
134. See id. at 1126 (arguing that Chilicky took the “final step in the wrong
direction” by abandoning any inquiry into legislative intent and simply deferring to the
alleged “expertise” of Congress).
135. See Wilson v. Libby, 498 F. Supp. 2d 74, 94-95 (D.D.C. 2007) (invoking a
broad application of the Totten doctrine to bar adjudication of the Wilsons’ claims).
136. See id. at 77 (acknowledging that the Wilsons’ claim arose out of a high-profile
incident, with intense media coverage, that implicated significant political
ramifications).
137. See Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875) (explaining that because
such contracts are forged in secret, even a speculative inquiry into their formation
would necessarily compromise national security).
138. See Pines, supra note 50, at 1299 (explaining how Totten serves to deter CIA
informants from bringing suit or using “grey mail” tactics used to induce expensive
settlements).
139. See id. at 1291 (insisting that any litigation that would involve a dissection of
the contractual terms of espionage litigation would undermine the entire intelligence
community).
140. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum, supra note 7, at 37 (disputing the defendants’
invocation of Totten on the grounds that the doctrine is designed to protect the interests
of the government and not individual tortfeasors).
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that contained no reference to or invocation of Totten on their behalf.141
Additionally, the district court admits that Wilson does not completely
square with Totten.142 The principal purpose of the Totten doctrine, barring
the revelation of the identities of intelligence agents, is inapplicable to
Wilson because Ms. Wilson’s identity had already been revealed.143 A
substantial portion of the litigation would involve the validation of nonsensitive information originally pleaded in the facts.144 As such, the
defendants’ assertion that the Wilsons’ claim would necessarily involve
adjudication of sensitive internal functions of the CIA is preposterous
where the defendants themselves leaked the sensitive information in
question, in contravention of their duty to protect classified security
secrets.145
Furthermore, even a broader application of Totten is inappropriate in
Wilson because it effectively immunizes the government from liability for
legitimate claims simply because of the possibility, however remote, that
sensitive information may be subject to discovery.146 The possibility that
sensitive national security information may be revealed in discovery does
not necessitate an absolute barrier to adjudication under Totten.147 Outright
dismissal is simply one legal shield at the government’s disposal to prevent
sensitive information from open discovery.148 In cases like Wilson, the
141. See id. (noting that the government likely would not have remained silent on
the Totten question if its invocation were truly appropriate).
142. See Wilson v. Libby, 498 F. Supp. 2d 74, 94 (D.D.C. 2007) (employing Totten
as a special factor while simultaneously acknowledging that Totten does not “squarely
apply” to the case at bar).
143. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum, supra note 7, at 38 (noting the irony that
defendants, accused of revealing the sensitive identity of a key intelligence operative
for partisan political gain, are now arguing against adjudication of the Wilsons’ claims
on the grounds that litigation in open court could possibly reveal the identity of other
intelligence operatives); see also Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 11 (2005) (allowing for the
invocation of Totten only where there is a possibility that the litigation itself would
reveal the existence of a clandestine espionage agreement, not where post hoc litigation
involves a relationship that has already been revealed).
144. See generally PLAME WILSON, supra note 5 (demonstrating how the facts as
pleaded by the Wilsons would not necessarily implicate sensitive information because
the facts necessary for sustaining a Bivens claim were not redacted from Ms. Wilson’s
memoirs of her time working for the CIA).
145. See id. at 179 (detailing how media apologists for the defendants spun Ms.
Wilson’s exposure by attributing it not to the defendants, but to Mr. Wilson himself, in
an attempt to deflect the fact that the defendants had indeed engaged in seriously
wrongful conduct). But see Wilson, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 94 (predicating its invocation of
the Totten doctrine on the need for the alleged protection of sensitive information).
146. See Flynn, supra note 50, at 801 (attacking the government’s frequent abuse of
Totten to dismiss claims in the second half of the twentieth-century).
147. Cf. Gardner, supra note 50, at 576 (noting that invocation of the State Secrets
Privilege for sensitive evidence does not automatically bar adjudication if its
suppression or exclusion does not prejudice a trial).
148. See Flynn, supra note 50, at 807-12 (contending that even where Totten
applies, outright dismissal of a claim is not necessary where other more plaintiff-
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court may utilize a wide array of judicial tools for protecting sensitive
information while proceeding with the ordinary course of litigation,
including in camera review of sensitive evidence or referral to a Rule 53
magistrate for review.149 As such, Totten dismissal should not be applied
broadly to cases, like Wilson, where alternative means sufficiently protect
sensitive evidence while still allowing the adjudication of a claim.150 The
district court could easily provide for the private review of classified
documents while simultaneously allowing for the open adjudication of nonsensitive questions of fact.151
IV. CONCLUSION
The Wilsons have highlighted a major problem with Bivens
jurisprudence, underscoring the need for effective civil mechanisms for
holding our highest public officials accountable to the rule of law.152 The
Bivens problem is systemic; the Wilsons are simply the most prominent
Bivens plaintiffs to be denied their rightful remedy on the basis of a
perplexing standard, confounded by Wilkie, and tilted against recovery for
constitutional injuries.153 In effect, federal courts have abandoned their
responsibility to provide a remedy where none exists for aggrieved Bivens
plaintiffs.154 The D.C. Circuit or, pending further appeal, the Supreme
Court should reconsider the special factors analysis to Bivens claims in
light of the deleterious impact it has had on plaintiffs like the Wilsons and
affirm the presumption of a remedy for the plaintiff faced with “damages or
nothing.”155 If the Court fails to do so, then Congress should take steps to
friendly practices are applicable).
149. See id. at 808-09 (arguing that courts have successfully adjudicated many in
camera claims that implicated military secrets); see also Gardner, supra note 50, at
593-94 (suggesting that magistrates with the requisite expertise could effectively
separate sensitive and non-sensitive evidence for discovery).
150. See Wilson v. Libby, 498 F. Supp. 2d 74, 92-93 (D.D.C. 2007) (barring the
Wilsons’ claim absolutely while simultaneously implying that criminal adjudication
under the IIPA is still appropriate).
151. See Gardner, supra note 50, at 593-94 (providing examples of how courts can
apply measures far less extreme than outright dismissal).
152. See Bandes, supra note 15, at 340 (explaining the need for Bivens liability in
the absence of a statutory waiver of federal sovereign immunity for constitutional
torts).
153. Cf. Tribe, supra note 48, at 25 (rejecting the Wilkie framework for lack of a
workable standard and providing judges with too much discretion in the dismissal of
Bivens claims).
154. See Steinmann, supra note 38, at 281-82 (asserting that courts have a
responsibility to deliver a remedy for the violation of constitutional rights where
Congress has not provided such).
155. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 410 (1971) (filling the remedial gap between federal and state constitutional torts
where no other remedy exists).
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bolster Bivens by either creating an explicit statutory alternative or
amending the Federal Tort Claims Act to encompass constitutional claims
against the federal government otherwise subject to Bivens actions.156
Regardless of the outcome, the Wilsons have at the very least
demonstrated the need for real civil accountability in the context of a
Washington political culture that sorely lacks it. Friends of Webster
Bivens, and the integrity of the Constitution, should salute the spy who
dared to sue the king, scaling the fortress of executive immunity for
constitutional torts.

156. See Hedrick, supra note 24, at 1065-69 (proposing the incorporation of Bivens
claims into the framework of a statute similar to the Federal Tort Claims Act for federal
liability under state tort law).
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